Introduction
The Ho Chi Minh trail is one
of the great legends of the second Indo China war, or Vietnam war or American
war ( depending where you are and who you are talking to). There are few people
outside Vietnam or Laos who have a comprehensive knowledge of these road and
path systems which wind their way south through the Truong Son Range of
Mountains.
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| The Mountains the trail was cut through. |
From the late 1950s to 1975,
the HCM Trail was the secret route of soldiers, weapons and supplies
moving from North Vietnam to the battlefields of the South. The terrain through which the pathways and
roads were constructed was one of the most challenging in S E Asia, cut through
jungle and across mountains and crossing wide rivers.
The Trail played a crucial
role in the Communist Victory over South Vietnam and its allies. The Ho Chi
Minh Trail was not just one route but a network of interlinking pathways and
roads. It is also important to realise that the Trail also ran along and across
the Laos/Cambodia and Vietnamese borders.
In total it is estimated that the Trail was about 1000 kilometres in
length but that 4700km of road and pathways had been constructed to service it.
In the beginning…..
The North Vietnamese idea of
a secret build –up of soldiers and supplies to support the war for the
unification of Vietnam and spread communism more widely started in the early
50s. For example, in 1951 four Vietminh
battalions (pre VNPA) were stationed in Laos to train the Pathet Laos – these
were the communist forces that refused to accept the return of government of
Laos by the French . Over the next few years,
Vietminh guerrillas continued to
infiltrate Laos. This was part of a longer term strategic plan to establish a
communist government in Laos.
On the 7th May
1954 - following the final collapse of the French government of Indo China, the
Peace talks in Geneva set up a temporary partition of Vietnam at the 17th
parallel along the Ben Hai River. This
divided the county into the Democratic Republic of Vietnam DRV (North) and the
Republic of Vietnam RVN (South). These talks also guaranteed the neutrality of
Laos and Cambodia. Temporary partition
was supported by China and the USSR which feared for their own national
security. The DMZ (de-militarised zone) extended 5km either side of the river.
In 1956 proposed elections
for a united Vietnam were called off by the contender in the South ( Ngo Dinh
Dien) because it was thought Ho Chi Minh and the communists would win. This
decision was backed by the USA. This caused the political situation to revert
to a military one. The North Reinstated Resolution 15 – revolutionary war.
The first Trail or track was initiated in June 1959 by orders from Ho Chi Minh to establish a secret route for the Vietnamese Peoples’ Army (VNPA,) linking North and South Vietnam within Vietnam “to walk without a mark, cook without smoke and speak without a sound”. . To do this the 559Th Transportation Group was formed to supply the North Vietnamese uprising against the South Vietnamese government, under the command of Colonel (later General) Võ Bẩm . Initially, the North Vietnamese effort concentrated on infiltration across and immediately below the 17th parallel or Demilitarized Zone that separated the two Vietnams.
Unfortunately for the North
Vietnamese, in early 1960, evidence of a disguised military transport network
from N to S was discovered south of the DMZ and the army of the Republic of
Vietnam ARVN moved into the area to cut the Trail. This forced the VNPA to search for
alternative routes south. The natural choice was to move south through neutral Laos and the Truong Son Mountains. As
a result, in early 1961 the VNPA moved into Laos to eliminate any resistance
from the Royal Laos Army leaving the Pathet Laos in place but passing control
of the countryside to the VNPA. This allowed the VNPA to move south on trails
made through the Laos mountains and valleys.
On 9th Sept 1964
the people of Nge An Province, Vietnam,
troops, army engineers and Youth Volunteers started to build a new strategic route called the Ho Chi Minh Highway ( also
referred to as the Truong Son Trail) –or
Route 15. The first section was built 40
Km NW of Kim Lien village where Ho Chi Minh was born. This appears to be the
first attempt to construct a roadway for trucks. US intelligence was aware of how important
this route was to the North Vietnamese war effort and bombing of roads
commenced when and where it could be identified.
As the war escalated through 1965, the USA started night bombing
the HCM trail where it was thought to be. The USA used Udorn in Thailand as
their base. This was the beginning of operation Steel Tiger. By mid year 1000
sorties per month were carried out. Special forces troops were dropped around the Trail to disable it but the VNPA
sent Special Group 565 to secure it from ground attack. On Dec 11 the USA used
B52s for the first time to strike the Mu Gia Pass, an important border crossing
into Laos.
In 1966 the USA began a
massive aerial and artillery bombardment of North Vietnam concentrating on
Hanoi and the area just north of the DMZ. The villages in this area were
encouraged to stay put by the Viet Cong (VC)
and to dig tunnels. After 19
month of tunnelling an enormous base was established underground. Whole
families lived here. These Vinh Moc tunnels on three levels 15m to 26 m below
ground served as an important storage base for the Trail.
To counteract what they saw
as a strategic threat, the USA built large bases near to where they believed
the Trail ran. Khe Sanh was one of these. From these large bases, patrols were
sent out in an effort to intercept anyone using the Trails. The task was too
great for the USA. Whereas the Trails and
the Viet Cong and VNPA support groups were based on deception and
fluidity, the US military bases were static. Once US patrols left these bases
they were by themselves. While they could be supported from the air, there was
always a time delay between combat on the ground and the arrival of air support
in the form of gunships and bombers. The use of guerrilla warfare allowed the
Viet Cong to disappear quickly once they had struck a blow.
In 1967 The MacNamara Line
was built by the US at enormous cost. This was an electronic anti-filtration
barrier below the DMZ from the coastline to the Mekong valley in Laos. Its
purpose was to sound an alarm if the VNPA or VC crossed to the south. It was monitored from a control base in
Nakhon Phanon in Thailand. It was patrolled by rangers and monitored through
sensors. Many Vietnamese and Laos villages had to be relocated. Its cost was
estimated to be US $3 .5 billion. The
VNPA was able to blow up parts of the line and large sections soon fell into
disuse .
The development of the Trail
As the war rolled onwards, the
Trail developed into a complex pattern of parallel truck routes and foot
paths. Most routes were dirt roads with
important portions paved with rock and pebbles. A large mileage was built in
Laos after the first 50 km in N Vietnam.
In the early stages there were two main N-S routes – Route 1 coastal (
abandoned in 1968) and Route 15, 12 and 20 through the mountains including
in Laos.
Most convoys departed from
three loading areas inside N. Vietnam making their way to the Laos border
following three paved highways build by the French before 1945. Each of the
three roads connected the Vietnamese provinces of Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang
Binh with the border and the Laos road network. After a short distance into
Laos the trucks headed south along the border. Eventually truck routes extended
as far as Sihanoukville, or Konpong Som in Cambodia on the gulf of Thailand.
From there supplies could be transported by sea and river to infiltrate the
South.
Other routes being developed
were 16, 24 and 18. Inevitably, once spotted, the USA targeted all the river
crossings with bombing raids. Many dummy routes were built to confuse the US
and South Vietnamese. It has been estimated that up to 40,000 people were used
to keep the Trail open. The natural environment especially the jungle provided
excellent cover with as many as three canopies of trees disguising what was
going on at ground level. The NV planted
trees and plants to give extra cover and to provide food for troops and
personnel in transit.
The US response was to use
defoliants such as Agent Orange to kill off greenery that gave cover to the
Trail. This killed off large areas of jungle that are still trying to recover.
Footpaths made up another part of the system. These inter-twinned with truck
routes. NV combat units moved on foot from areas just north of the DMZ.
Civilian labourers (dan cong) also used these pathways carrying backpacks or on
bicycles. These footpaths were an
integral part of the logistical lines and with truck routes. Supplies were
often unloaded from trucks along the Trail and carried by porters on backpacks
across the border into S Vietnam. Like
truck routes, footpaths ran mostly in Laos territory parallel with the border.
The network branched off east in many places leading supplies and troops to
logistical bases set up inside S. Vietnam often located in deep underground in
tunnels.
The strategic use of the
Trail was largely the responsibility of Corps 559 under General Dong Si Nguyen
responsible to General Giap. Corps 559 had several Binh Trams ( army stations)
each BT was responsible for a part of the trail. For example BT1 (later BT31)
was responsible for the Mu Gia Pass to Lum Bum in Laos. It was well organised
with two engineers’ battalions, two truck battalions, an AAA battalion, two
infantry companies, three stores companies, a medical care unit, three teams of
surgeons, a quarantine unit, and a truck repair workshop. This was typical of
the structure of BTs.
By 1967 every 3- 5 kms of the
Trail had an area for storage of crushed stones to fill craters or muddy areas.
There were workshops at regular intervals to mend trucks; decoy roads; AAA
positions; medical help and air raid shelters ( usually caves). A tally of US
bombs dropped was also recorded.
More than 40,000 people were
involved and the Trail became an open battlefield in the war. As the war progressed, on the VNPA side,
developments included use of more sophisticated and effective communication
systems (24/7); regular rations for soldiers, strategic use of youth volunteers
and carefully planned BT bases. Corps 559, important for its role in protecting
the Trail throughout the war, moved to Lun Bum in Laos. Other measures included
one way systems in storage depots, loading bays equal to the height of lorries,
increased manpower for loading and single lane tracks hidden by trees, some
planted and interwoven to screen lorries from aircraft. Porters loads were
reduced to 20Kg from 30Kg. Where trucks had to cross rivers underwater bridges
were constructed to avoid detection by US aircraft.
The Pipeline
In 1968, the VNPA was
experiencing a desperate shortage of fuel supplies in the mountain areas.
Amazingly porters had maintained the petrol supply by carrying bags of fuel
from N Vietnam to stores in the Mu Gia Pass where it was taken south through
Laos by BT31. This unit put the fuel in barrels and floated them down the rivers:
first down the River Nam Heu and eventually carried by porters to Nam Se
Bangti. Portering was dangerous heavy work and very inefficient. A pipeline
seemed to be the answer.
The first section was built
in 1970 around Ban Bac and then from Ban Co to Muang Nong with three storage
depots north of Route 9 at Ra Khum and Muang Nong. The second section was
constructed from Muang Nong to Ban Bac. Ban Bac was heavily bombed by the US in
1970 after another electronic barrier across Laos ( code name Tropical Trees)
showed that truck movements stopped in this area. This suggested to the US that
there was a storage depot here. The VNPA
claimed that despite this, no pumping stations or fuel storage depots were hit
and that fires reported by the US were decoys to confuse bombers. No one will
ever know the truth.
Each section of the pipeline
had to be carried to its position piece by piece. Much of it hung from trees or
was buried in shallow trenches. The USSR
refused to back the project claiming it was not feasible. Undaunted the
North Vietnamese army carried on by using
home-made pipes and pumps. Pumps were buried to protect them from heat
seeking AC 130 planes of the US. The pipeline project took the Trail into a new
era. It minimised loss of fuel and lives and there was no longer a need for
bulk transport of fuel by road.
The Chinese supplied the fuel
into N. Vietnam initially by train then by pipeline in 1972. The Soviets sent
tankers of fuel to Huang Tu in China.
Eventually the pipeline stretched from Mong Cai and Langson ( 09.08.72)on the
border with China to Bu Gai Map in S Vietnam. (01.02.75)
Hot Spots .
In November 1968 US bombing
of N Vietnam stopped at the time of the abortive Paris Peace talks. This good
will gesture did not extend to Laos and bombing of the Trail continued unknown
largely to the outside world. B52s concentrated their bombing on two hot spots:
route 20 and Xieng Phan respectively known as the Desert of Fire and the Bowels
of Hell for fairly obvious reasons. The effect was to force the VNPA to construct even more by-passes.
Because of continuous and
unrelenting US Bombing, Dong Loc – ‘a
place of death’, became another hot spot. In 1968 the US dropped 46,300 bombs
on this area. The US attacked virtually every day – day and night. Traffic was
kept moving by the Youth Volunteers teams mending roads clearing unexploded
bombs, maintaining bridges etc.
The Mu Gia Pass to Laos by
route 9, know as the Secret Garden was
controlled by Army Group 1 ( BT1) was a
particular hot spot for bombing. Famous
for its secret roads, this fed into a large network of routes in southern
Laos It became a battle ground between
the Pathet Laos, Neutralists, Royalists, the
US and S.Vietnamese.
Eventually the Royalists and
the Neutralists in Laos lost their grip in this area, but the US continued by
dropping napalm on forest areas to uncover the trail. This caused massive
casualties and whole Lao communities had to move to caves e.g. Tam (cave)
Phanang. This cave was home to more than 2000 people 1971-75. Several old French roads e.g. Route 12 through
the Mu Gia Pass were well known to the US so new roads were constructed using alternative mountain passes. The US
carried out massive bombing raids on all these routes (e.g Steel Tiger and Barrel Roll), often 5000 or
more sorties a month.
The battle of Lam Son
719 was one of the final pushes by South
Vietnam, backed by the US to cut the Trail.
It failed despite inflicting heavy losses on the VNPA. Anticipating the
attack into the southern Laos area,
Corps 559 established a very sophisticated and elaborate tunnel system
in the mountains to protect supplies and troops from continuous bombing by the
US.
In July 1970 a few months
before Lam Son the US managed to close the sea supply route of the VNPA to
Sihanoukville Port in southern Cambodia. This was a vital route into S Vietnam
for the VNPA. The VNPA realised that the southern Trail through Laos was
crucial to maintaining supplies to its troops fighting in S Vietnam. The US
also recognised that the Trail had to be its next major target.
The VNPA strengthened its
command of the Trail and worked with the PLA
to secure all ground in S Laos, preparing for an imminent invasion by
the ARVN. Many diversions were created together with a build up of troops. The
VNPA was very well prepared. The US
operation in Jan 1971 ( called Dewey Canyon II ) was limited to air support
while the ARVN fought on the ground.
The US committed 2000 fixed wing aircraft and 600 helicopters
to support 17,000 ARVN. Meanwhile an unknown number of VNPA waited undercover
in Laos without engaging in any major battles.
By the 8th Feb the
ARVN had crossed into Laos near Lao Bao and moved onto Ban Dong. The only
action they encountered was sporadic m/c gun fire. The VNPA effectively drew
the ARVN with the US into a trap. The VNPA had more than 600 AAA cannons and m/c gun positions located
in the hills and on day 4, large numbers of US helicopters were caught in cross
fire from these well placed guns.
On Feb 11th the
previously hidden VNPA divisions advanced on Sepon taking out established ARVN
firebases and retaking command of much of route 9. By March Phase 3 of the ARVN
attack was bogged down.
By the end of March the
battle of Lam Son 719 was over. There were high casualty rates on both sides
but particularly on the North Vietnamese side. Both sides claimed a victory but
the Trail was not cut and this was the last major assault on the Trail by the
ARVN before the final defeat of South Vietnam.
Conclusion
The Ho Chi Minh Trail was a
great military success for N Vietnam. The massive firepower of the US and South
Vietnamese armed forces failed to stem the flow of materials, supplies and
troops from the North. Not surprisingly
many military strategists at the
time believed that bombing and the
McNamara Line would fail to defeat the enemy and that only a defence line of
several infantry divisions across the border in Laos reaching to the Mekong
River would be effective. They were
probably right.
However, success for North Vietnam had a very high price. The cost of the Trail can be estimated in the
lives of 10s of thousands of young men and women civilian porters who were
killed by bombing, sickness and exhaustion. They were undoubtedly
motivated by their ambition for a united
Vietnam, the philospohy of Ho Chi Minh
and incredible loyalty to their country, as well as fear from being shot for
dereliction of duty. (They could also live on less than 400 grams of rice a
day.)
You may hear that a new Ho
Chi Minh Trail is being built. This is a new N-S highway entirely inside Vietnam costing US$ 5
billion. It is entirely within Vietnam
running almost parallel with the Lao border. It has no connection with the
original trail.
A short history of the Ho Chi Minh Trail
Ken Shooter.
U3AC Military History Society Presentation - 16.05.14
Pictures. Chris Corbett
Pictures. Chris Corbett
